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In chapter III of his Short Treatise, in what is a clear predecessor of E1p18, Spinoza argues that 
since God is the only substance, anything other than God can neither exist nor be understood 
without God, from which it follows that God is the cause of all things (ST I, iii).  Spinoza then 
elaborates eight different respects in which this is so, the second of which notes that God is “an 
immanent and not a transitive cause, since he does everything in himself, and not outside himself 
(because outside him there is nothing)” (ST I, iii).  This is in close alignment with his one 
explicit employment of immanent causation in the Ethics, in E1p18, where he argues that 
because God is the only substance, anything else that exists must inhere in, be conceived 
through, and caused by God.  Because anything whatsoever is caused by and exists within God, 
God is an immanent cause of all things (E1p18dem).  Spinoza appears in both works to 
understand an immanent cause as a cause whose effect exists within it.
1 
I believe that there is more to immanent causation, at least in Spinoza's later Ethics, than 
this initial reading suggests.  While there can be little dispute that God is the ultimate cause of all 
things, or that everything whatsoever inheres in God, I will argue that these commitments, 
though suitable for explaining how God is the immanent cause of infinite modes, are insufficient 
for explaining how God is the immanent cause of individual finite modes.  If the effect inhering 
in its cause is insufficient for explaining how God is the immanent cause of individual finite 
modes then we should entertain the possibility that there is more to immanent causation than an 
effect inhering in its cause. 
After reviewing Spinoza's argument in E1p18 and raising a problem for thinking about 
immanent causation along traditional lines, I argue that we can better understand how God is an 
immanent cause of individual finite modes by understanding the causal efficacy between modes 
as an extension of God’s causal efficacy.  If I am right, then we should expand our understanding 
of immanent causation to include this feature. 
 
E1p18 AND THE INHERENCE READING OF IMMANENT CAUSES 
 
Let’s take a closer look at Spinoza’s rationale in the Ethics for his claim that God is the 
immanent, not transitive, cause of all things: 
 
Everything that is, is in God, and must be conceived through God (1p15), and so (by 
1p16cor1) God is the cause of all things, which are in him.  That is the first [thing to be 
proved].  And then outside God there can be no substance (by 1p14), i.e., (by 1def3), 
thing which is in itself outside God.  That was the second.  God, therefore, is the 
immanent, not the transitive cause of all things, q.e.d.” (E1p18dem) 
 
 Spinoza appeals to E1p15 and E1p16cor1 to establish that God is the cause of whatever is 
in him before appealing to substance monism (E1p14) to establish that nothing exists outside of 
him.  An immanent cause is a cause whose effect exists within it; if everything that exists is 
caused by God and exists within God then God is an immanent cause of all things.  A transitive 
cause, by contrast, is a cause whose effect exists outside it.  Because God is the only substance, 
anything else that exists must be a mode of God, and as such cannot exist outside God. From 
these two arguments, if God is the cause of whatever exists within him and nothing can exist 
outside him then God is the immanent cause of all things.  Our focus in what follows will be on 
the first argument, namely, God's being the cause of whatever is in him. 
A slightly more technical reading of E1p18dem might go as follows.  According to 
E1p15, anything whatsoever that exists inheres in God and cannot be conceived without God.
2
  
Spinoza’s rationale for this is fairly straight-forward (for a reader of Spinoza at least): only 
substances and their modes exist, and any mode of a substance is in and conceived through that 
substance.  Because God is the only substance, anything else must be a mode of God, and 
therefore must be in and conceived through God.  Anything whatever that is not God, then, 
inheres in God.  E1p16 casts this inherence in causal terms; whatever inheres in God does so by 
following from God's nature.
3
  With a corollary clarifying that God is the efficient cause of 
anything that follows from its nature, it follows from E1p15 and E1p16cor that God is the 
immanent efficient cause of all things. 
We can best appreciate inherence as the mark of immanent causation by looking at 
Spinoza's doctrine of infinite modes.  The infinite and eternal modes are those features or 
expressions of God that follow immediately (meaning directly) from its nature (E1p21-23).
4
  We 
can infer from the nature or definition of a circle as a line with one fixed point and one point in 
motion, for instance, that every line drawn from its center to its circumference will be equal.  The 
equality of its radii is an inherent feature or expression of the circle that is not included in its 
definition but instead follows immediately from it.  Just as the equality of its radii is a feature of 
the circle that follows from its nature alone, so too are the infinite modes features of substance 
that follow from its nature alone.  Substance is an immanent cause of its infinite modes because 
they follow from and inhere in it alone. 
The same can be said of God’s finite modes.  Spinoza writes in E1p33 for instance that 
“Things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order than they have 
been produced.”  He reasons that the order of finite modes could be different only if God's nature 
were different, indicating that the existing order of finite modes is an entailment of God’s nature, 
that is, God's nature unfolding itself.  Because they are modes, they additionally inhere in God, 
meaning that they both follow from and inhere in God, making God their immanent cause.  
 
A PROBLEM WITH THE INHERENCE READING 
 
This reading of immanent causation is grounded in Spinoza's explicit remarks on the matter, 
captures well the immanence of infinite modes, and resonates with his remarks on the 
immanence of individual finite modes.  It does not, however, explain how God is the immanent 
cause of individual finite modes.  I would like to raise two problems with this reading before 
proposing that we expand it to include God’s causal efficacy. 
One problem with the inherence reading of immanent causation is that Spinoza restricts 
God's being a participant in the cause of a finite mode to God being expressed through its finite 
cause, but these causes are transitive.  As Spinoza argues in E1p28, finite modes come about 
only through the efficacy of other finite modes.
5
  The causal relation between finite modes is, 
however, typically transitive.  This is evident enough when, for instance, Spinoza specifies that a 
mother who produces a child does not share the existence of her child since one can perish 
without affecting the other (E1p17s).  A mother can perish without affecting her child only if the 
mother and child are distinct existences, that is, only if the child exists apart from its mother.
6
  
Assuming this is typical of finite causes, finite causes are typically transitive.   
The problem arises once we take note of the way in which Spinoza depicts God's 
involvement.  “The idea of a singular thing which actually exists has God for a cause not insofar 
as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea of a singular 
thing …” (E2p9).7  God is the cause of some finite idea not because God is an infinite being that 
encompasses all finite ideas but, rather, because the finite cause is a finite and determinate 
expression of God.
8
  But as we just saw, finite causes are transitive.  If God produces individual 
finite modes only because God is expressed through their finite and determinate causes and these 
causes are transitive then God’s causing individual finite modes is transitive.  So while it is of 
course true that all modes inhere in God, how God is the immanent cause of individual finite 
modes is unclear. 
Additionally, I think the inherence reading of immanent causes fails to take notice of 
passages where Spinoza appeals specifically to God’s causal efficacy in explaining how God is a 
cause of finite mode. Spinoza draws upon E1p16 in E1p25s, for instance, to note that “God must 
be called the cause of all things in the same sense in which he is called the cause of himself.”  
God's causal responsibility for all things is here cast not in terms of inherence but instead in 
terms of efficacy; God is the cause of all things on account of the efficacy that produces all 
things being only ever an extension of the efficacy necessitating God’s own existence.  Spinoza 
adds in E1p29dem and E1p34dem that God’s power is the cause both of God’s existence and of 
everything that follows from it, which he affirms in E1p36dem as the claim that  “whatever 
exists expresses in a certain and determinate way the power of God, which is the cause of all 
things.”  If God conceived as an infinite being (and, suggestively, therefore a being that 
encompasses all things) does not explain how God is an immanent cause of individual finite 
modes then perhaps God's causal efficacy does.
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GOD’S IMMANENT CAUSATION AS GOD’S CAUSAL EFFICACY 
 
I have already shown that Spinoza on several occasions explains God being the cause of all 
things by appealing not to inherence but, rather, to God’s causal efficacy.  I believe that this 
aspect alone captures how God is the immanent cause of individual finite modes and therefore 
that we should include it in our understanding of how God is the immanent cause of all things.  I 
support this suggestion by first showing that finite natures are always included in finite causes 
and arguing that Spinoza intends for these natures to serve as proxies for the causal efficacy of 
God and its laws.  I then show that finite modes are immanent causes precisely when their 
behavior follows from their own natures.  If finite modes are immanent causes when their 
behavior follows only from God’s efficacy as it is expressed through their own natures then 
God’s immanent causation of individual finite modes may be nothing more than their following 
entirely from its efficacy. If God is an immanent cause of individual finite modes because of its 
efficacy then we should expand our understanding of immanent causation to reflect this. 
  
Let's begin by noting Spinoza's curious inclusion of finite natures in finite causes.  He 
writes in the digression on bodies that “All modes by which a body is affected by another body 
follow both from the nature of the body affected and at the same time from the nature of the 
affecting body” (E2p13adda1”).  This is true, of course, for ideas as well: “The idea of any mode 
in which the human body is affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human 
body and at the same time the nature of the external body” (E2p16).  For any finite effect where 
one mode is affected by another, the effect follows from and involves the natures of whatever 
modes are involved in the cause and its effect.
10
  Causal relations between different finite modes, 
then, always involve the natures of both the affecting and affected modes. 
This shows that finite natures are involved in any behavior wherein finite modes are 
made to act in some way by other finite modes.  Spinoza elsewhere writes that finite natures are 
also involved in behaviors which are caused entirely by the mode itself.   “[W]e act when 
something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause, i.e. (by 3def1), when 
something in us or outside us follows from our nature, which can be clearly and distinctly 
understood through it alone” (E3def2).11  If these actions can be understood through our nature 
alone then they follow from our nature alone (cf. E1ax4), meaning that we are active when our 
actions follow from our nature alone.  Combining this with the passages noting that modes 
affecting other modes involve the natures of both the affecting and affected modes, which we 
should call ‘passive behavior’,12 we can conclude that a mode is acted on (passive) when its 
action follows from its nature working alongside the natures of whatever other modes are 
affecting it and that a mode is active when its behavior follows from its nature alone.
13
  Because 
all behavior is either active or passive, the causal activity of finite modes always follows from 
and involves their natures.
14
 
This is a curious thing.  We have a rough sense of God’s involvement in finite causes, 
namely, that anything whatsoever is ultimately God’s nature unfolding itself or, better yet, that 
any causal efficacy is only ever an extension of God’s causal efficacy.  We can also certainly 
appreciate what the modes (or even just their features) contribute to causes; Clara is attracted to 
Dirk for instance because Dirk has broad shoulders and a generous disposition.  We can 
additionally appreciate Spinoza’s note that causal actions occur always in accordance with 
nature’s fixed and unchanging laws (E3pref).15  While we can appreciate how these elements 
might be involved in finite causes, the inclusion of finite natures is a mystery.  Spinoza does note 
in E2p13addax1” that the involvement of natures explains how the same mode can be affected 
differently (because the natures of its different causes are different) and that different modes can 
be affected similarly (if the natures of their causes are the same), but he nowhere explains how 
involving natures in finite causes explains this.   
We can shed light on the inclusion of finite natures in finite causes by noting Spinoza’s 
elision between natures and laws. Recall from E3def2 that finite modes are active when they act 
from their own nature and passive when their behavior follows from their own nature working in 
concert with other natures.  Spinoza glosses this definition in E4p2dem by noting that we are 
only a partial cause of an effect that “cannot be deduced from the laws of our nature alone.”  He 
later refers to E3def2 as meaning that “a man acts entirely from the laws of his own nature when 
he lives according to the guidance of reason…” (E4p35cor1).16  In both applications Spinoza 
understands laws as efficacious components of finite natures to refer in some intimate way to 
nature's laws.  We are passive when the laws of our nature are insufficient to determine our 
action, whereas we are active, that is, live in accordance with reason, when the laws of our nature 
alone determine our action.  If laws are intimately tied to our natures then it is reasonable to 
suggest that Spinoza means for the causal efficacy of our natures to refer in some intimate way to 
nature's fixed and unchanging laws.  If we combine these passages with the oddity of including 
natures in finite causes and the curious absence of nature's laws we can conclude, I think, that 
Spinoza regards natures in finite causes as a kind of substitute or proxy for nature's laws.
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As mentioned earlier, laws are fixed and unchanging constants in nature (E3pref).  Many 
commentators understand this to imply that laws are among the infinite modes, meaning that 
laws are instances of the infinite and eternal expressions of God’s causal efficacy.18  I think that 
Spinoza means with the elision of natures and laws to imply that finite natures are how God’s 
causal efficacy is expressed in the finite order.  Just as laws express God’s causal efficacy in 
infinite and eternal ways, so too do finite natures express God’s causal efficacy in finite and 
determinate ways.  Thus when Spinoza notes that God is the cause of all things in the same 
respect in which God causes itself (E1p25s), or that the power through which God exists is the 
cause of all things (E1p36dem), we should understand him to mean that the efficacy expressed 
through the laws of nature is the selfsame efficacy through which finite natures compel finite 
behavior.  If so, then we have a portrait of how God is a cause of individual finite modes, 
namely, in virtue of the efficacy that brings about any finite behavior being only ever an 
extension of God’s causal efficacy. 
I believe that this analysis, brief as it may be, provides a foundation for understanding 
how God is an immanent cause of individual finite modes.  I develop this view by identifying 
where finite modes are their own immanent causes and using this as an illustration of God’s 
immanent causation in the finite order.  Let’s consider, then, where finite modes are their own 
immanent causes. 
The human mind is best served, Spinoza thinks, when it infers from its current adequate 
ideas additional adequate ideas.  This, of course, is the third kind of knowledge; knowledge 
which “proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the 
adequate knowledge of the essence of things” (E2p40s2).19  We begin with our adequate idea of 
God’s essence (E2p47) and deduce from this adequate ideas of other things (E2p47s).20  This 
process culminates in the mind’s highest virtue which, Spinoza tells us, is its possessing an 
adequate idea of God (E4p28).  The mind’s greatest virtue lies then, in rough overview, in 
expanding its collection of adequate ideas by inferring from its existing adequate ideas additional 
adequate ideas.  Since the additional adequate ideas arise from, further express, and are 
contained within the mind itself, this process is eminently immanent.
21
  When the human mind is 
best realizing its greatest good it is doing so, then, by engaging in immanent causation. 
Though certainly a worthwhile start for locating immanent causes in the finite order, 
given the rarity of this feat I suggest we look for more prevalent instances of immanent causation 
in the finite order.  We can do so, I propose, if we consider partial causes.  Unlike an adequate 
cause “whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it,” an inadequate or partial 
cause is one whose “effect cannot be understood through it alone” (E3def1).  Dirk’s gift is an 
inadequate or partial cause of Clara’s smile since we need to include, alongside the gift, Clara’s 
fondness for pearls, the luster of the pearls themselves, etc.  Recalling the language of 
E2p13addax1” and E2p16, the affect of Clara's smile involves the natures of Clara, Dirk, and the 
pearls; all three are partial causes and collectively they are an adequate cause of Clara's smile.  
Given that Clara's smile is a feature of Clara, meaning that it is contained within her, and 
furthermore that her nature is part of its cause, we might reasonably suggest that Clara's nature is 
a partial immanent cause of her smile.
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  Generalizing, because the natures of affected modes are 
always involved in the cause of their affects, finite natures are always partial immanent causes of 
affects of their mode.  And if parts of a cause can be immanent alongside other parts that are 
transitive then immanent causation is much more prevalent in causal relations between finite 
modes than we might think. 
This raises a difficult question however, namely, whether a cause can be both immanent 
and transitive or, more perspicuously, in part immanent and in part transitive.  If not, if any 
transitive component in a cause renders the cause itself transitive, then the vast majority of finite 
causes will be transitive, making it difficult to identify frequent, genuine instances of immanent 
causation in the finite order.  Though a discussion of the ontology of causes is beyond the 
purview of this chapter, I would like to offer one piece of evidence in support of immanent and 
transitive components working alongside one another in finite causes.  Dirk's nature and the 
nature of the pearls are transitive causes of Clara's smile only from the perspective of separate 
finite modes.  From God's point of view, Dirk's, the pearls', and Clara's natures are contained 
within the same corporeal substance as Clara's smile.  Since the three natures and Clara's smile 
are all contained within the same substance, the natures are immanent causes of Clara's smile.  
This move recalls Spinoza's frequent contrast between ideas as they are conceived through a 
finite mind with those same ideas as they are conceived through God's mind.  As he explains in 
E2p28 for instance (though keeping with Clara's smile and Dirk's gift), the idea in Clara's mind 
of her smile is inadequate since it follows from her nature and the natures of Dirk and the pearls 
despite the latter existing external to Clara.  The idea of Clara's smile in God's mind, by contrast, 
is adequate since none of the natures are external to the corporeal substance encompassing 
Clara's smile.
23
  If the idea of Clara's smile in God's mind is adequate, and the idea in God's mind 
would understand Clara's nature as a partial immanent cause of her smile, then Clara's nature is a 
partial immanent cause of her smile.  Though this issue is by no means closed, I think we can 
tentatively conclude that since the nature of a finite mode is included in any of its active or 
passive behaviors, individual finite modes are often if not always partial immanent causes of 
their behavior.  Immanent causes, then, are considerably more prevalent in the finite order than 
we might typically think.  
With this we have the ingredients in place to propose a sharper picture of how God is the 
immanent cause of individual finite modes.  Immanent causes amongst finite modes, whether 
complete or partial, occur when a finite mode's behavior is caused by its nature.  If its nature is a 
kind of proxy for nature's laws, then a finite mode is an immanent cause when and to the extent 
that its behavior follows from the laws that are written into its nature.  Once we recognize these 
laws as instances of the immediate or mediate expression of God's causal efficacy we understand 
that individual finite modes are immanent causes when their behavior follows from their own 
expression of God’s causal efficacy.  Because finite modes are finite and determinate instances 
of God, finite immanent causes should explain how God too is an immanent cause.  The 
extension of God’s causal efficacy into the causation of finite behavior explains, then, how God 
is an immanent cause of individual finite modes.   
I argued earlier that the inherence reading, while adequate for explaining how God is an 
immanent cause of the infinite modes, does not explain how God is an immanent cause of 
individual finite modes.  If causal efficacy does then we should include it in our understanding of 
God’s immanent causation. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
1
  See also Spinoza’s brief mention of God as an immanent cause in the first dialogue following chapter II of Part I 
of the Short Treatise.  I use the term ‘effect’ to denote the product of a cause.  I use the term ‘affect’ to denote any 
change that a mode undergoes (cf. E1def3). 
2
  As you can see, the second argument in E1p18dem is redundant since Spinoza's arguments for E1p15 already 
secures that nothing can exist outside of God. 
3
  The careful reader may recognize that E1p15 and E1p16 refer to possibly distinct sets of modes.  From E1p15 we 
know that anything whatsoever that exists is a mode of God.  When Spinoza transitions into the causal terminology 
of E1p16 however, he is discussing only those modes that follow from the divine nature.  It is unclear whether the 
                                                                                                                                                             
set of all modes whatsoever is isomorphic with the set of modes that follow from the divine nature.  That Spinoza 
understands them to be the same is evident, however, by his interchangeable use of “God” and “God’s nature” in 
E1p15dem.  If any mode whatsoever is contained in God then it is also contained in God’s nature (E1p15).  From 
E1p16&cor, any modes that are in God or God’s nature are so only by following from, i.e., being caused by, its 
nature. 
4
  Kristina Mechelski defends a different and unique reading of the infinite modes in chapter three of this volume. 
5 
 “Every singular thing … can neither exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it is determined to exist 
and produce an effect by another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence …” (E1p28). 
6
  We also find a characterization of finite modes as transitive causes following a discussion of God as an immanent 
cause in ST II, xxv1.  Thanks to Stephen Zylstra for directing me to this chapter.  
7
  We see this claim first in E1p28.  I have chosen to discuss it within the confines of E2p9 because this proposition 
more perspicuously delineates God’s involvement. 
8
  As E1p28 makes clear, this is true for modes of each of the other attributes. 
9
  Sophie Lavéran also discusses a broader reading of immanence than mere inherence in her chapter on the Finite 
Modes in chapter four of this volume. 
10
  Spinoza justifies E2p16 in large part by referring back to E2p13addax1” (see E2p16dem).  This suggests that the 
“follows from” locution in E2p13addax1” is synonymous with “involves” in E2p16. 
11 
 Spinoza defines an adequate cause in the preceding definition as a cause “whose effect can be clearly and 
distinctly perceived through it” and a partial or inadequate cause as a cause whose effect “cannot be understood 
through it alone” (E3def1).  If we act when some action can be understood through our nature alone (E3def2), then 
our nature is its whole or complete cause. 
12
  Spinoza continues E3def2 by noting that “we are acted on [passive] when something happens in us, or something 
follows from our nature, of which we are only a partial cause.” 
13
  Spinoza is referring to what we might call the action's immediate cause.  It is unclear whether such actions further 
require that the cause's cause, or that cause's cause and so forth be included in the finite nature.  God's involvement 
in such causes will be addressed in the next section. 
14 
 We could push for the stronger claim that causal relations between finite modes are restricted to relations between 
their natures, meaning that finite natures are the only causally efficacious components in finite causes.  I will not 
review this issue here. 
15  “Nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting are everywhere one and the same, i.e., the laws and 
rules of nature, according to which all things happen, and change from one form to another, are always and 
everywhere the same.” 
16 
 This is reminiscent of Spinoza’s remarks in TIE that “The essences of singular, changeable things … [are] to be 
sought only from the fixed and eternal things, and at the same time from the laws inscribed in these things, as in 
their true codes, according to which all singular things com e to be, and are ordered” (101). 
17 
 For another route to this conclusion, we might argue that finite natures are finite instances of eternal essences (see 
E5p22, E2p45, and E2p8cor) and that eternal essences and nature’s fixed and unchanging laws are infinite modes.  If 
                                                                                                                                                             
so, then Spinoza may refer to finite natures because he understands finite natures as the finite instances of nature’s 
eternal essences and laws.  For further elaboration and different defenses of this view see Christopher Martin, “The 
Framework of Essences in Spinoza’s Ethics,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (2008), 489-509 and 
Don Garrett, “Spinoza on the Essence of the Human Body and the Part of the Mind That Is Eternal,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Spinoza’s Ethics ed. Olli Koistinen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 285-
292. 
18
  I argue for this view in Christopher Martin, “The Framework of Essences”.  See also Yirmiyahu Yovel, “The 
Infinite Mode and Natural Laws in Spinoza,” in God and Nature: Spinoza's Metaphysics ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991) 79-96 and Edwin Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1969) 47-49 and  59.  Kristina Meshelski challenges the understanding of laws of nature as infinite modes in chapter 
three of this volume.  
19
  See John Grey’s “Reason and Knowledge in Spinoza” in this volume for further discussion of reason and 
Spinoza’s second and third kinds of knowledge. 
20
  “The human mind has an adequate knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence” (E2p47).  The scholium adds 
that “... God's infinite essence and his eternity are known to all.  And since all things are in God and are conceived 
through God, it follows that we can deduce from this knowledge a great many things which we know adequately, 
and so can form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in E2p40s and of whose excellence and utility we 
shall speak in Part 5.” 
21 
 Though Spinoza doesn’t address this issue, with parallelism this notion would carry over to the body, meaning 
that the bodily expressions that follow from the bodily correspondent of adequate ideas would be instances of 
immanent causation as well. 
22 
 For an effect that is contained only partially within Clara we can additionally conclude that Clara's nature is again 
a partial immanent cause of this effect relative to the extent to which her nature contributes to the effect and to the 
extent to which the effect is contained within her.  I will not pursue this more attenuated sense of immanent cause 
here, except to note that the rationale should be the same. 
23
 The analogue, of course, is the mind’s production of adequate ideas by drawing only upon its other adequate 
ideas.  The causes themselves are distinct, but their being contained in the same mind renders the causality between 
them immanent rather than transitive.  Spinoza’s worm in the blood thought-experiment in ep. 32 is another 
illustration of this idea. 
